Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.[142] This title was sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained: "It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."[143] Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.[144] Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as "native title." It simply said: "The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."[145] This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.[146] This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land laws. [147] He discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case. (b) Indian Title In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians.[148] This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans.[149] This was clearly demonstrated in the case