Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of the Court's jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the exercise of the Court's remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and consequentiality. Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance and paramount interest to the nation,[3] the Court must take the liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them. [4] This Court thus did so in a case[5] that involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until and exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be considered to be of overriding concern. The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its significance to the nation and its people now and in the generations yet to come. Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 ("IPRA"), enacted into law in 1997 and made effective on 22 November 1997, is apparently intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the rights of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national unity and development"[6] and commands the State, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs," to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.[7] Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral domains" to embrace "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources" including "ancestral lands, forest, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise," over which indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual ownership and control. IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some forms of self-governance over the curved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7 of the law which states that the "rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected," subsumed under which would encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use lands and natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c); the right to return to their abandoned lands in case of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral domains previously reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily with customary law (par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains." These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception of agricultural lands, "shall not be alienated." It ordains that the "exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."[8] These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific mandates in the 1935