Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

effectuate the specific purpose of the law.[66] A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional. In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public domain and, thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor General advance the following arguments: First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago. Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the original source of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is the source of any asserted right of ownership in land. Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists. However, petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution. Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However, they contend that the mandate is subject to Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners, the recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of Congress. Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the public domain and other natural resources. I am not persuaded by these contentions. Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is understandable. Not only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been regarded, almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of Philippine land law. It has been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been recognized by the Court.[67] Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the