Court decisionSource checked
Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
G.R. No. 135385 · 2000 · Indigenous peoples and ancestral domains
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DIGITAL P. 78 / 101
natural resources,[116] as well as the State's full control and supervision over the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources.[117] Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3 (a),[118]
5,[119] and 7[120] of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states, in part, that "
[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State."
[121] They would have the Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of
natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of State ownership
over these resources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and composition
of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to
be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a
yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any
right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not
declarative of a right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure that no
unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation
process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein
does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous
peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of
indigenous people over the natural resources simply because it recognizes ancestral domains as their "private but
community property."
The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples' concept of
ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, "ownership" is the
"independent and general power of a person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within the limits
established thereby."[122] The civil law concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or the right
to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use, jus
disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that which is owned and jus
vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing owned.[123] In contrast, the
indigenous peoples' concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By
virtue of the communal character of ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed"[124] because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not merely the individual
member.[125]
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear
from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous
peoples over their ancestral domains, to wit:
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8[126] rights to ancestral domain, this is where we
transferred the other provision but here itself ---
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier,
Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all
agree that that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous
communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we
not also provide a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before
any mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam
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