Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion of the framers of the Constitution on this point, the national plan presumably takes into account the requirements of the region after thorough consultation.[156] To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, and the right not to be removed therefrom without their free and prior informed consent.[157] As to non-members, the prior informed consent takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the indigenous peoples and non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State enters into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and regulations such as the Philippine Environmental Policy,[158] the Environmental Impact System,[159] the Local Government Code[160] and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995[161]already require increased consultation and participation of stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in the planning of activities with significant environment impact. The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous peoples must be procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance, renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or to the perfection of any production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as a grant of the power to control the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, but merely the imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or agreement. The clear intent of the law is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which may be adversely affected by the operation of such entities or licensees. Corollary Issues A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause. The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection of the laws." Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the due process clause.[162] Petitioners' contention is erroneous. Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56," which reads: Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and protected. Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect. The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.