Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

[163] What IPRA only requires is that these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity. Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines.[164] With regard to ancestral domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the final report of the ADO.[165] With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report by the ADO.[166] Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples. Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP[167] and the application of customary law,[168] violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of indigenous peoples,[169] and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving indigenous peoples,[170] including even disputes between a member of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of ancestral domains.[171] Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They merely contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."[172] In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied first in disputes involving property, succession and land,[173] and that such laws shall likewise be used in disputes involving indigenous peoples.[174] They assert that "[w]hen the dispute involves a member of an [indigenous cultural community and another who is not], a resolution of such a dispute based on customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial of due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not know what these customary laws are."[175] Petitioners' concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non- indigenous peoples. A person's possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non- indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of justice. In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP. Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under