Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cariño vs. Insular Government;[195] (2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other natural resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant certain rights to the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of the same, as well as priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation thereof. The State retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with the grant of said rights to the indigenous peoples, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991[196]and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.[197] Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted to them under the aforesaid laws; (3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their ancestral lands and domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who may have acquired rights of ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources within the ancestral lands and domains;[198] (4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others, establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and (5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President does not infringe upon the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President's control and supervision with respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the SEC. In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition. [1] Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979); Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 (1952). [2] In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913). [3] In Philippine Colonial history, the term indio applied to indigenous throughout the vast Spanish empire. India was a synonym for all of Asia east of the Indus River. Even after it became apparent that the explorer Christopher Columbus was not able to reach territories lying off the east coast of Asia, the Spanish persisted in referring to all natives within their empire as los Indios. (Owen J. Lynch, Jr., THE PHILIPPINE COLONIAL DICHOTOMY: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 PL J 112 [1988] citing R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESIDENT 5 [1979]. [4] WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976), p. 1151. [5] Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 The American Journal of International Law 414, 419 (1998) citing Jose Martinez Cobo, Study