"Y" Transit Co, Inc. Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Et Al.

". . . In operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the registered owner and should be responsible to him (the registered owner) for any damages that he may cause the latter by his negligence." Conversely, where the registered owner is liable for obligations to third parties and vehicles registered under his name are levied upon to satisfy his obligations, the transferee of such vehicles cannot prevent the levy by asserting his ownership because as far as the law is concerned, the one whose name the vehicle is registered remains to be the owner and the transferee merely holds the vehicles for the registered owner. Thus, "Y" Transit Co., Inc. cannot now argue that the buses could not be levied upon to satisfy the money judgment in favor of herein respondents. However, this does not deprive the transferee of the right to recover from the registered owner any damages which may have been incurred by the former since the . . . transfer or lease is valid and binding between the parties. . . ." 7 Thus, had there been any real contract between "Y" Transit Co., Inc. and Yujuico Transit Co., Inc. of "Y" Transit Co., Inc. and Jesus Yujuico regarding the sale or transfer of the buses, the former may avail of its remedies to recover damages. Regarding the Motion for Contempt filed by petitioner, we are constrained to deny the same since the Order to levy upon petitioner's alleged properties was issued even before the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order. From the records, it appeared that Labor Arbiter Villarente ordered the public auction of the subject properties on June 5, 1989. The Supreme Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order on June 19, 1989 and this was received by the Labor Arbiter on June 22, 1989. On June 28, 1989, the Labor Arbiter directed the sheriff to release the two buses already levied upon by him. Likewise, we find no error in requiring petitioner to pay the storage fees prior to the release of the properties. Storage costs are imposed in accordance with the provisions of Rule IX of the NLRC Manuel of Instructions for Sheriffs, to wit: "Sec. 3. Storing of Levied Property. ---- To avoid pilferage of or damage to levied property, the same shall be inventoried and stored in a bonded warehouse, wherever available, or in a secured place as may be determined by the sheriff with notice to and conformity of the losing party or third party claimant. In case of disagreement, the same shall be referred to the Labor Arbiter or proper officer who issued the writ of execution for proper disposition. For this purpose, sheriffs should inform the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ of corresponding storage fees, furnishing him as well as the parties with a copy of the inventory. The storage fees shall be shouldered by the losing party." WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Motion to Cite Labor Arbiter Benigno Villarente, Jr. is DENIED and petitioner is ordered to PAY storage costs and sheriff's fees. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Bidin and Melo, Vitug, JJ., concur. --------------- Footnotes 1. Rollo, p. 36. 2. Rollo, pp. 28-29. 3. Ibid., p. 11. 4. Section 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. ---- Subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of the Commission previously had xxx xxx xxx (g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights or any part thereof; or merge or consolidate its property, franchises, privileges or rights, or any part thereof, with those of any other public service. The approval herein required shall be given, after notice to the public and after hearing the persons interested at a public hearing, if it be shown that there are just and reasonable grounds for making the mortgage or encumbrance, for liabilities of more than one year maturity, or the sale, alienation, lease, merger, or consolidation to be approved, and that the same are not detrimental to the public interest, and in case of a sale, the date on which the same is to be consummated shall be fixed in the order of approval: Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of its business. xxx xxx xxx 5. 94 Phil. 182 (1953). 6. 105 Phil. 949 (1959). 7. Montoya v. Ignacio, supra.