Authority of the Acting Vice-Mayor to Appoint Officials and Employees of the Sangguniang Panlungsod

At the outset, the extent of the authority of an official designated in an acting capacity has been discussed by the Department in Legal Opinion No. 64, s. 2018, citing Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 000778 dated 24 March 2000. As distinguished from an officer-in-charge, an appointment in an acting capacity entails the exercise not only of the ministerial functions attached to the position but also of the discretionary powers vested therein. An acting official is, for the duration of the designation, authorized to discharge the powers, duties, and functions of the position, subject to the terms and limitations of the designation and to existing laws and regulations. Accordingly, as Acting Vice-Mayor, Hon. Shaira Aliyah “Barbie” Diaz may generally exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions vested by law in the Vice- Mayor under Section 456 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC), including the authority under Section 456(a)(2) to appoint all officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, except those whose manner of appointment is otherwise specifically provided by law. Such authority was also confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of La Carlota City vs. Rojo (G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012) which involved the appointment by the Vice-Mayor of La Carlota City of the Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary. The Court recognized the Vice-Mayor as the appointing authority in connection with the appointment of the Sanggunian Secretary. The authority of the Acting Vice-Mayor, however, should not be construed as extending to every person who performs services for, or is assigned to, the Sangguniang Panlungsod. The determination of the proper appointing or contracting authority depends on the nature of the personnel concerned, the manner by which the engagement is made, and, particularly, the source of funds from which the compensation is charged. In Legal Opinion No. 70, s. 2023, the Department confirmed that the source of funds is a material consideration in determining the proper appointing authority over personnel of the Sanggunian, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Atienza v. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005. In said case, the Supreme Court clarified that although the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose salaries are paid out of provincial funds, such authority does not extend to officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose salaries are charged against appropriations specifically made for the legislative body, as such authority is lodged with the Vice- Governor. The Court likewise recognized the authority of the Vice-Governor over casual and job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, insofar as the applicable legal and appropriation framework places them under the legislative body. The foregoing principle is anchored on the separate appropriation of the Sanggunian and the authority of the Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor over personnel of the local legislative body whose positions and compensation are specifically provided for therein. Thus, the fact that an employee performs duties for, or reports to, the Vice- Mayor or the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not, by itself, determine who possesses the appointing authority. Rather, the source of funds, the nature of the position, and the manner of engagement must be considered. Consistent with this principle, the Department has previously distinguished between personnel of the Sanggunian whose salaries are charged against the general funds of the local government unit and those whose salaries are charged against appropriations specifically made for the Sanggunian. The same distinction applies to Page 2 of 5