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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Separate Concurring Opinion: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao — Official PDF
271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion
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DIGITAL P. 10 / 26
Separate Concurring Opinion G.R. Nos. 271059,
271347, E-02472, and E-04036
for foreign-assisted projects that were not included in the proposed budget but
are likely to be effective during the forthcoming fiscal year. 30 Ultimately,
unprogrammed appropriations are more anticipatory in character, consistent
• with, their characterization as ·a ·"standby" , authority to incur· additional
obligations.
Simply put, there has been no showing that special appropriations
bills and unprogrammed appropriations, as means by which Congress can
appropriate public funds, are mutually exclusive, Hence, Article VI, Section
25, paragraph 4 should not be construed as a limitation on Congress' exercise
of the power of the purse. On the contrary, the provision serves as another tool
- alongside the introduction of unprogrammed appropriations in the GAA
- by which the legislature can effectively and expeditiously meet the
demands of the fiscal year.
Traversing now the issue of whether the concept of unprogrammed
appropriations per se violates the doctrine of separation of powers, which, as
earlier intimated, is anchored on the perceived unlawful intrusion by the
Executive into the "determination of fiscal contingencies,"31 I submit that the:
Court mu,st still stay its hand in declaring this concept unconstitutional.
l • t '
In resolving such query, particular attention must be given to the fact
that the inclusion ofunprogrammed appropriations in the GAA is effected by
none other than Congress itself At the very least, this demonstrates that there
is no tug-of-war between the two co-equal branches of government. Au
contraire, what transpired is an intentional grant of power by one branch, i.e.,
the Legislative, to another, i.e., the Executive. Properly reframed, the core
matter of this controversy, therefore, is the validity of the delegation of
legislative power. In turn, this impels the Court to examine intently the tenor
of the grant of such authority. The following exchange is illuminating:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DIMAAMPAO:
On page 37 of your petition, you advanced the view that the inclusion of the
unprogrammed appropriations under the General Appropriations Act of2026
violates undue delegation of power. Is that correct?
ATTY. PENA:
We confirm thf\t, Your Honor..
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DIMAAMPAO:
Because?
ATTY.PENA:
Because of. ..
30 See TSN, April 7, 2026, p. 40-41; see ponencia, pp. 45.
31 See Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. E-04036), p. 36.
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