271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Separate Concurring Opinion: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao — Official PDF

Separate Concuning Opinion 13 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potesf (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle • that such delegated power con~titutes not only ,a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.40 In determining whether a law unduly delegates legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests, namely: (1) the completeness test, and (2) the sufficient standard test. The first requires that the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that the only thing that the delegate must do is to enforce it. The second test mandates the presence of adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.41 In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa,42 the Court invoked, among others, the principle of non-delegation of powers in resolving the constitutionality of both the.Congressional and Presidential Pork Barrels. , , Anent the former, the Court concluded that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article of Republic Act No. 10352 or the 2013 GAA violated the principle of non-delegability insofar as it effectively allowed individual legislators to assume the powers of Congress. This was made evident by the fact that they possessed "post-enactment identification authority," which was explained in the foHowing wise-- In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates i:he principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to ·individually exercise the power of appropriation, which - as settled in Philconsa ·- is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29 (1 ), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon),held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the p~1bl,ic revenue for (b) a specifit;d pi,irpos.e. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article 40 See Gerochi v. Department of Energy (DOE), 554 Phi!. 563, 584 (2007) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc]. 41 See Venus Commerciai Co., Inc. v. Department ofHealth, 916 Phil. 16, 50-51 (2021) [Per J. Lazaro Javier, First Division]. 42 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. I