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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Separate Concurring Opinion: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao — Official PDF
271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion
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DIGITAL P. 14 / 26
Separate Concurring Opinion 14 G.R. Nos. 271059,
271347, E-02472, and E-04036
authorizes individuai legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, ailow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as
well as ail other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutiona!.43
(Emphasis in the originai; citation omitted)
With respect to Presidential Pork Barrel, the Court was tasked to settle
two issues: (1) whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as
. may, be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 910, relating to the Malampaya Funds; and (b) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office ofthe President of the Philippines" under Section 12
of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional for unduly
delegating legislative power.
Anent the first issue, the Court proffered an affirmative answer,
declaring the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" invalid as it "does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President's authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used."44 This
therefore allowed the President to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.45
• Apropos the Presidential Social Fund, the Court found that the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" gave him carte
blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastn1cture project he
deemed a "priority." Verily, the law gave no guideline with which to construe
the same.46 In addition, the Court also noted that the delimitation of a project
as an "infrastructure" was ''too broad of a classification since the said term
could pertain to any kind of facility ."47
In my view, the danger presented by the inclusion of unprogrammed
appropriations, as presently worded under the 2026 GAA, lies in the breadth
of post-enactment discretion afforded to the Executive Department, akin to
mechanism of a pork barrel fund. In this regard, there appears to be two key
stages during which a wide latitude is exercised, particularly in the event that
the first trigger is satisfied.
43 See Belgica, et ul. .v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 721 Phil. 416, 547-548 (2013) (J. Perlas-
Bernabe, En Banc].
' 44 Id. at 569.
"' Id.
46 Id.at571.
47 Id.
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