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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Separate Concurring Opinion: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao — Official PDF

271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion

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DIGITAL P. 14 / 26
Separate Concurring Opinion 14 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 authorizes individuai legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, ailow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as ail other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutiona!.43 (Emphasis in the originai; citation omitted) With respect to Presidential Pork Barrel, the Court was tasked to settle two issues: (1) whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as . may, be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, relating to the Malampaya Funds; and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office ofthe President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional for unduly delegating legislative power. Anent the first issue, the Court proffered an affirmative answer, declaring the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" invalid as it "does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President's authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used."44 This therefore allowed the President to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.45 • Apropos the Presidential Social Fund, the Court found that the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" gave him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastn1cture project he deemed a "priority." Verily, the law gave no guideline with which to construe the same.46 In addition, the Court also noted that the delimitation of a project as an "infrastructure" was ''too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility ."47 In my view, the danger presented by the inclusion of unprogrammed appropriations, as presently worded under the 2026 GAA, lies in the breadth of post-enactment discretion afforded to the Executive Department, akin to mechanism of a pork barrel fund. In this regard, there appears to be two key stages during which a wide latitude is exercised, particularly in the event that the first trigger is satisfied. 43 See Belgica, et ul. .v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 721 Phil. 416, 547-548 (2013) (J. Perlas- Bernabe, En Banc]. ' 44 Id. at 569. "' Id. 46 Id.at571. 47 Id.