271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Separate Concurring Opinion: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao — Official PDF

Separate Concurring Opinion 23 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 In view of the foregoing disquisitions, I find myself agreeing with the ponencia that the first trigger, as provided under Special Provision 1 of subsection XLIII oft.1-ie 2026 GAA, must be declared unconstitutional. I also highlight that the second trigger must be dealt with the same verdict in the absence of any sufficient standard to guide the allocation of new revenue collections. Likewise, a standard that is anchored on the excess revenue collections in any one of the identified non-tax revenue sources from its corresponding revenue collection target, should henceforth be proscribed. I must hasten to add, nonetheless, that as seen from the above disquisitions, the standards must not come from the Judiciary, but from Congress itself, ,following the comple{eness and the sufficient s_tandard tests which .have been deeply ingrained in jurisprudence. • Congress' act of increasing the appropriations recommended by the President cannot be sanctioned. Finally, the esteemed ponente declared Congress' increase of the unprogrammed appropriations from PHP 281.9 Billion to PHP 731.4 Billion unconstitutional.64 • I register my wholehearted support to this legal conclusion. In Pimentel III v: Matula, 65 I proffered three reasons why the prohibition under Article VI, Section 25, paragraph 166 is not confined to programmed appropriations, but extends even to unprogrammed approrpiations. These are: 1. The said provision plainly forbids Congress from increasing the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. There is thus neither rhyme nor reason to differentiate between programmed and unprogrammed appropriation, and any contrary interpretation would introduce a distinction that is not found in the said provision. 2. There is no reason why there should be a striking difference in the treatment of the National Expenditure Program (NEP) and the BESF. In fact, the NEP is inextricably intertwined with the BESF as it contains the details of the government's estimated expenditures and even "serves as the basis in the eventual drafting of the general appropriations bill." Accordingly, the prohibition against increasing 64 Ponencia, p. 117. 65 G.R. Nos. 274778, 275405 & 276233 (2025) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc]). . . 66 ~ECT!ON 25. (]) The C01,gress may not incre;,,;e the appropriatipns recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as speciaed in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. 1