271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Separate Concurring Opinion: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao — Official PDF

Separate Concurring Opinion 5 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 ATTY. SALENGA: No, Your Honor. In our petition, we laid down, Your Honor, the definition for calamity, Your Honor, and emergency, Your Honor. Therefore, there's nothing really to distinguish, Your Honor, this or. .. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DIMAAMP AO: Do you agree that the propriety of determining whether ... determining whether the acceptance is justified, that belongs to Congress? , ,ATTY. SALENGA: ; Your Honor ... because, Your Honor, as stated in our p~tition, Your Honor, there's also a law backing our definition for calamity, Your Honor. Specifically, Republic Act 10121, Your Honor. It's specifically stated there. Therefore, if the Congress would interpret it differently, Your Honor, also differently than the Constitution provides, Your Honor, just for the mere expediency of accomplishing the delivery ... the budget, Your Honor, in a short amount of time, then it deprives the analysis deliberations needed for such long provisions or budgeting amounts, Your Honor. 5 (Emphasis supplied) On one hand, prior to Congress' acceptance of and action on the certification, it would be premature for the Court to entertain any challenge thereto. In such case, the Court would effectively be substituting its own judgment for that of Congress. In the event, for example, that the latter decides to ignore the same, then there would be no challenge that may l:;>e brought before the former in the first place. On the other, assuming that the certification already received a favorable reception, then any directive from the Court would have to be addressed to Congress - whether it be the GAA's invalidation or the conduct of three readings anew. Notably, a different framework, as in the present controversy, would eventually result in a palpable disconnect between: (1) the action instituted, in which the act being assailed originated from the Executive Department; and (2) the relief awarded, which would be directed to Congress. Thus, while I share the view that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the exercise of the power granted under Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2 of the Constitution,6 I submit that, in the ultimate analysis, the challenge must ascribe grave abuse of discretion not to the mere fact that the President issued a certification of urgency - an act that, by itself, is not contrary to the Constitution - but rather to Congress' acquiescence to "immediately enact" the relevant legislative measure and thereby deviate from the usual requirements under the aforementioned •constitutional provision. As such, what the· Court would actually have to assess is how Congress exercised such power, such as whether a certification 5 TSN, June 9, 2026, pp. 89--92. 6 See rollo, p. 29. t