271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Separate Concurring Opinion: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao — Official PDF

Separate Concurring Opinion 7 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 ostensibly established. This standard is none other than Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution which states: •• SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. In the oft-cited case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, 13 the Court explained that the fundamental principle of separation of powers means that "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." 14 Article VI, Section 1 is a clear manifestation of of this principle. Thus, to the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws, in the same way that the power to enforce laws belongs to the executive branch of government, through the President; and the power to interpret laws belongs to the judicial branch of government, through the courts. 15 Each of these departments has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.16 • Corollary to the foregoing, the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, 17 identifies the ways by which a breach of the principle of separation of powers is committed: Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "[o]ne branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function'.';and "[a]lternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions. 18 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original) As above adumbrated, one of the chief disputations against the concept of unprogrammed appropriations, particularly in the 2026 GAA; is that it "transgresses the constitutional limits on the power of appropriation and , breaches the principle of separation of powers in violation of Article VI, Section 24 and 25." 19 Their existence in the budget is being questioned on the theory that it permits the executive "to activate massive expenditures based 13 63 Phil. 139 (J 936) [Perl Laurel, En Banc]. 14 Id. at 157. 15 See Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416,534 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. 16 See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (J 936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 17 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Perlas Bernabe, En Banc]. 18 See Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416,535 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. 19 See Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. E-04036), p. 35. i