271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Separate Concurring Opinion: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao — Official PDF

Separate Concurring Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 on its own detennination of fiscal contingencies," thereby collapsing the 20 constitutional distinction between the executive and the legislative. Relatedly, the petitions also assert that the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.21 Nary a doubt, the present constitutional challenge invokes a violation of none other than Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution, because the Executive has been charged with the assumption of the Legislature's power. , The fact that the saine violation, goes into a basic; principle .in our system of government should not be a license to overlook the alleged transgression. On the contrary, it means that the Court should act with more zeal in performing its constitutional duty of maintaining inviolate the architecture that was set by the highest Iaw of the land. Unprogrammed appropriations are not unconstitutional per se. The ponencia takes the position that unprogrammed appropriations, defined as standby authority to incur additional agency obligations for priority programs or projects when revenue collection exceeds targets, and when additional grants or foreign funds are generated,22 are not unconstitutional per se in the absence of any constitutional provision explicitly prohibiting them.23 On this score, Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution provides that sources of financing include receipts from both existing and proposed revenue measures, thereby showing that the Executive is given "some flexibility in , managing the budget and proposing appropriations · to cover agency expenditures contingent on the availability of additional resources."24 While there is indeed no evident prohibition against the inclusion of unprogrammed appropriations in the GAA, I submit that there are two key arguments that must likewise be passed upon in order to remove any perceived cobwebs of doubt as to their legitimacy. The first relates to Article VI, Section 25, paragraph 4 of the Constitution, while the second is the aforementioned infringement of the doctrine of separation of powers. I will discuss these in seriatim. Article VI, Section 25, paragraph 4 of the Constitution provides the requirement for a special appropriations bill, to wit: 20 Id. at 36. 21 Id. at 37-39. , r· : - 1 22 See Depa....+.ment of ' Budget and Management, G_lo'ssary. of Terms available at https://wwvv.dbm.gov.ph/wp-contenJil!P}oads/BESF1/BES£2026/GLOSSARY.pg[ (last accessed September 17, 2026). 23 Ponencia, p. 41. 24 ld. at 51-52. 1