271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo — Official PDF

Concurring Opinion 16 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization." To conform with the governing· principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated. 57 (Emphasis supplied) • As further explained by another author, vesting Congress with the ,power of the purse arms the immediate representatives of the people with a complete and effective weapon for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for "carrying into effect every just and salutary measure."58 This power has been shown to be the legislature's "powerful instrument" for resisting "all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the govemment."59 Despite the efficiency presented by the option of just vesting the exercise of this awesome power to one individual, the framers and the people, eventually chose to vest it in Congress, which is composed of diverse individuals representing diverse interests and divided into separate chambers. 60 This is because the members of Congress, especially those from the House of Representatives, are presumed to be more knowledgeable than the president when it comes to the needs of their respective constituents and the priority that must be given to the funding of the projects.61 Hence, inasmuch as the president can propose the budget, it is the Congress which has the final say on the matter of appropriations,62 as long as it stays within the bounds set by our Constitution.63 While the Executive is equipped to ascertain the fiscal health of the nation as a whole, Congress, through the various interests represented therein, ensures that sectoral or provincial interests are duly considered and reflected in the appropriations. Thus, the Executive prepares the budget from a macroeconomic perspective while Congress amends it from a microeconomic viewpoint. This is the beauty behind the constitutional design. 57 Arau/lo v. Aquino Ill, 737 Phil. 457, 601-603 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. 58 Adam J. White, What Is Congress's Power of the Purse, 48 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 811,811 (2025), citing James Madison, FEDERALIST No. 58. 59 Id. 60 Abner J. Mikva, Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the Power, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1986). 61 See Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 305 Phil. 546, 567 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc] discussing the Countrywide Development Fund; and Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 561 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] discussing the history of pork barrel. -62 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 305 Phil. 546, 566 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc]. 63 Of course, upon proper challenge, the Court can strike down the acts of Congress relating to the power of the purse, as it has done before.