271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo — Official PDF

Concurring Opinion 17 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and''E-04036 To synthesize the foregoing points, it is clear to my mind, that the reason behind vesting Congress with the power of the purse and in effect, its supremacy in the budget process, is the recognition that Congress, composed of various members who act as direct representatives of the people in two separate chambers, allows it to effectively scrutinize the president's budgetary proposals. Therefore, the members of Congress, in their collective wisdom, are presumed to be more aware of what their constituents directly need and will therefore make choices which will redound to their benefit. It then follows that so long as the boundaries set by the Constitution are respected,64 Congress has the power, and more importantly, the duty, to guard the purse by modifying or even changing the items in the President's Budget which Congress deems proper. This is precisely how Congress wields its most effective weapon in serving as the check and balance - against the president, Constitutional Commissions, other administrative bodies and agencies, and even the Judiciary - as they will not be able to operate without . Congress allocating funds to them first. Necessarily, it also follows that unduly restricting Congress's power of the purse defies this delicate balance instilled in our Constitution - a danger which should never materialize under this Court's careful watch. Congress's power of the purse allows it to create new PAPS. and transfer PAPS from Programmed to Unprogrammed Appropriations, and vice versa. In light of these considerations, I humbly opine that Congress should be allowed to: (a) create new PAPs and (b) transfer PAPs from Programmed to Unprogrammed Appropriations, and vice versa, so long as certain . safeguards are.followed. At the risk of sounding repetitive, Congress is given Constitutional supremacy in deciding how the budget will be spent, which P APs to fund and by how much, as it deliberates on the President's Budget and drafts the GAA.65 Necessarily, this comes with the prerogative to create new PAPs and transfer P APs from Programmed to Unprogrammed Appropriations, and vice versa, when Congress deems proper. 64 For instance, the. proscription against increasing the appropriations recommended by the president as contained in art. VI, sec. 25(1) or the prohibition against riders contained in art. VI, sec. 26(1 ). 65 Arau/lo v. Aquino Ill, 737 Phil. 457, 547-548 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. ~