271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo — Official PDF

Concurring Opinion 23 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 donors. They should not be subject to political bargaining. Substituting local projects (those identified by legislators which have not gone through extensive benefit-cost analysis and are not implementation-ready) for carefully crafted foreign-assisted projects has two adverse consequences: (1) it delays project implementation and, (2) it results to higher commitment fees. RULE 4. Accept Congress's right to amend. During my watch, I recognized that the power of the purse belongs to Congress. However, as a matter of policy, I allowed any amendment to the President's Budget that for as long as it had the effect of improving it. We realize that the Executive Department does not have a monopoly of good judgment. Hence, I agreed with any proposal that is superior to a proposal in the President's budget in terms of cost-benefit analysis and for as long as the project is implementation ready. Otherwise, I promised to consider the legislator's amendment to the President's Budget in the next budget cycle. 75 (Emphasis supplied) •• To my mind, the proposals of Hon: Diokho serve as great starting points for the safeguards which this Court may consider. As regards the power to create new P APs, Congress must be able to show that these PAPs are implementation-ready. at the very least. Inasmuch as Congress has the power to create new P APs, this must be balanced with the reality that it is the Executive who implements the GAB once it is passed into law. Hence, creating PAPs which have a low or inexistent chance of implementation leads to the significant risk that the funds appropriated for them will just be wasted. Requiring that these new P APs be implementation- ready, to my mind, significantly reduces this risk. At the same time, it recognizes Congress's role as a strong check and balance as it can modify and even change the president's budgetary suggestions through the creation of new and implementation-ready PAPs. As regards the power to transfer P APs from programmed to unprogrammed, and vice versa, Congress must ensure that, at the very least, such transfer does not effectively frustrate the government's valid and existing obligations, whether locally or internationally. As explained by Hon. Diokno, the transfer of FAPs from Programmed to Unprogrammed Appropriations not only delays implementation-ready projects which have been vetted by competent third-party organizations, but also results to higher costs for the government: 75 Benjamin E. Diokno, Will the Budget Outcome Be Different This Time? On the Road Towards Fiscal c,~,,;,,,,,,, ,,,-••• ~, Ac_,.,,,,,, ,e, ,_,, 4