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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo — Official PDF
271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion
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DIGITAL P. 5 / 24
Concurring Opinion 5 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347,
E-02472, and E-04036
unable to show that the certification was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. 12
Third, Unprogrammed Appropriations are not unconstitutional per se.
These appropriations by nature are contingent legislative authorization for
spending, whose sources of funding may be based not only on existing
revenue measures but also ones which are proposed. As explained by Amicus
Curiae Dr. Benjamin Diokno, they were originally intended to cover funding
for Foreign-Assisted Projects (F APs) which were not included in the proposed
budget but are likely to become effective during the forthcoming fiscal year.
Hence, Unprogrammed Appropriations should be understood as a means of
giving the president appropriate leeway to address present realities, especially
crisis situations. Ultimately, these appropriations per se are valid as long as
they act as limited standby authorization, according to their original intent,
and preserve the integrity of the integrated national fisc~i program
contemplated in Article VII, Section. 22 of the 1987 Constitution. 13
Fourth, the Unprogrammed Appropriations under the 2026 GAA is not
a rider. They are unambiguous because Special Provision 1 provides the
specific conditions for which these funds may be used. Moreover, they are
appropriate because they do not have to be the subject of separate legislation,
as they already operate as contingent funds for government operations. 14
Fifth, Special Provision l(a) and (b), under Section XIII of the
Unprogrammed Appropriations in the 2026 GAA violate Article VII, Section
22 of the Constitution, as pegging the fiscal triggers to any excess or new
revenue collections does not assure the deficit neutrality contemplated for
unprogrammed appropriations. More importantly, this contravenes Araullo v.
Aquino III, 15 wherein the Court already held that unprogrammed funds, which
function as standby appropriations, must only be released when there are
revenues in excess of the total revenue targets stated in the Budget of
. Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF). 16•
Sixth, Article V, Section 25(4) of the Constitution on special
appropriation bills is inapplicable to the Unprogrammed Appropriations being
challenged, as the latter are items included in the GAAs themselves. 17
12 Id. at 27-32.
13 Id. at 41-47.
14 Id. at 48-50.
15 737 Phil. 457 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
16 Ponencia, pp. 50-56.
17 Id. at 56-57.
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