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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo — Official PDF

271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion

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DIGITAL P. 5 / 24
Concurring Opinion 5 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 unable to show that the certification was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 12 Third, Unprogrammed Appropriations are not unconstitutional per se. These appropriations by nature are contingent legislative authorization for spending, whose sources of funding may be based not only on existing revenue measures but also ones which are proposed. As explained by Amicus Curiae Dr. Benjamin Diokno, they were originally intended to cover funding for Foreign-Assisted Projects (F APs) which were not included in the proposed budget but are likely to become effective during the forthcoming fiscal year. Hence, Unprogrammed Appropriations should be understood as a means of giving the president appropriate leeway to address present realities, especially crisis situations. Ultimately, these appropriations per se are valid as long as they act as limited standby authorization, according to their original intent, and preserve the integrity of the integrated national fisc~i program contemplated in Article VII, Section. 22 of the 1987 Constitution. 13 Fourth, the Unprogrammed Appropriations under the 2026 GAA is not a rider. They are unambiguous because Special Provision 1 provides the specific conditions for which these funds may be used. Moreover, they are appropriate because they do not have to be the subject of separate legislation, as they already operate as contingent funds for government operations. 14 Fifth, Special Provision l(a) and (b), under Section XIII of the Unprogrammed Appropriations in the 2026 GAA violate Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution, as pegging the fiscal triggers to any excess or new revenue collections does not assure the deficit neutrality contemplated for unprogrammed appropriations. More importantly, this contravenes Araullo v. Aquino III, 15 wherein the Court already held that unprogrammed funds, which function as standby appropriations, must only be released when there are revenues in excess of the total revenue targets stated in the Budget of . Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF). 16• Sixth, Article V, Section 25(4) of the Constitution on special appropriation bills is inapplicable to the Unprogrammed Appropriations being challenged, as the latter are items included in the GAAs themselves. 17 12 Id. at 27-32. 13 Id. at 41-47. 14 Id. at 48-50. 15 737 Phil. 457 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. 16 Ponencia, pp. 50-56. 17 Id. at 56-57.