271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo — Official PDF

Concurring Opinion 6 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 Seventh, Section XLIII on Unprogrammed Appropriations in the 2026 G1\...A partly constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, insofar as the first and second fiscal conditions are concerned, i.e., excess or new revenues. Particularly, Special Provision l(a) and (b) are too broad and lack adequate guidelines/limitations which map out the boundaries of the , president's authority . for determining . when . the Unprogrammed Appropriations may be availed of. There is no standard for implementation as regards where the excess funds should go first, i.e., whether to Programs, Activities, and Projects (PAPs) under the Programmed Appropriattons or those under Unprogrammed Appropriations. In other words, the lack of standards authorizes the Executive to indiscriminately spend for unprogrammed expenditures, regardless of whether or not the projected revenues for the funding of programmed P APs are realized. Furthermore, the president is also given unbridled discretion as to which among the purposes under the Unprogrammed Appropriations will be funded, and the amounts to be spent therefor. 18 Eighth, in relation to the immediately preceding point, the item/purpose of "Strengthening Assistance for Government Infrastructure and Social Programs" or "SAGIP" is also unconstitutional. It operates as a prohibited lump-sum appropriation and as a "post-enactment identification feature," both of which have been described in Belgica,. 19 ' '' Ninth, Congress cannot increase the amount of Unprogrammed Appropriations recommended by the Executive Branch. Since the constitutional prohibition against Congress to increase the president's recommended appropriations does not distinguish, it should be interpreted to include both Programmed and Unprogrammed Appropriations. Thus, applying this to the instant case, the ponencfo declared that Congress's increase of the Unprogrammed Appropriations by PHP 449.5 billion violated the constitutional prohibition under Article VI, Section 25(1) because the Unprogrammed Appropriations increased from PHP 281 billion to PHP 731.4 billion, while the level of Programmed Appropriations remained the same at PHP 4,019.8 billion; thus, effectively increasing the President's proposed appropriations by PHP 449.5 billion.20 The ponencia also declared that the BESF in Article VII, Section 22 of the , Constitution includes all appropriations ,whether programmed or unprogrammed. Therefore, the prohibition against increase under Article VI, Section 25(1) is in the total appropriations (programmed and unprogrammed). " Id. at 57-74. 19 Id. at 73-76. 20 Id. at 76-82.