271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo — Official PDF

Concurring Opinion 7 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 It recognizes that part of Congress's oversight powers over the budget, is to determine which PAPs to fund and by how much, to make reallocations, including transfers of Programmed to Unprogrammed Appropriations and vice versa. Nonetheless, Congress's discretion is limited by the budget ceiling imposed under Article VI, Section 25(1). Consequently, there can be no increases in Unprogrammed Appropriations unless there is a corresponding decrease in programmed ones. Similarly, there should be no transfer of PAP from Programmed to Unprogrammed Appropriations unless there is a reduction in the budget for the programmed.21 The ponencia adds that the increase in Unprogrammed Appropriations and/or transfer of a PAP from programmed to unprogrammed without a corresponding reduction in the Programmed Appropriations, effectively increased ilie total appropriations proposed by the president. It violates Article VI, Section 25(1) of the 1987 Constitution; hence, unconstitutional.22 Tenth, the prohibition on increasing the presidential budget under Article VI, Section 25(1) does not apply to SAGFs as these constitute already existing appropriations. Congress, in the exercise of its oversight functions, may review the projections of the Executive and make appropriate adjustments in the SAGF. Nevertheless, Congress's increase in the appropriation for the Special Road Fund, which was included as a line item in the DPWH budget and therefore forms part of the appropriations subject to the budgetary ceiling, is unconstitutional. 23 Eleventh, the Bicameral Conference Committee exceeded its authority when it increased the Unprogrammed Appropriations in the 2024 GAA by PHP 449 .5 billion. While the Bicameral Conference Committee may reconcile 'the House-approved and Senate-approved versi'ons of the· 2024 General Appropriations Bill since the two are not exactly alike, its proceedings must be transparent and accountable. The absence of any report of what transpired during the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee does not meet this requirement. The Bicameral Conference Committee increased the presidential budget in violation of Article VI, Section 25(1) of the Constitution. Ratification by both Houses of Congress will not cure the defect of the action taken by the Bicameral Conference Committee. 24 Twelfth, despite the unconstitutionality of several provisions of the 2024, 2025, and 2026 GAAs, the doctrine of operative fact applies. This is because the Unprogrammed Appropriations in the 2024 GAA and the Special 21 Id. at 83-84. 22 Id. at 87-88. 23 Id. at 89-109. 24 Id, at 109-114.