271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo — Official PDF

Concurring Opinion 9 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 perform their constitutional duties. It is perhaps in line with this reasoning that the Court, in Pimentel v. House ofRepresentatives,28 held that: In any event, the only appropriate judge of whether a certification of urgency is proper is the Congress. No one else. Not even the Court, absent any proof that it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It is for the Congress that this certification is intended; and so, it is the Congress alone which stands as the judge of its proper usage. 29 Like any other provision of the Constitution, however, Article VI, Section 26(2), as a measure to safeguard the proper preparation and review of laws, is meant not just for the convenience of Congress, but ultimately for the benefit and protection of the people for whom the laws are put in place. It is in this sense that the Judiciary's power to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion matters most. The opinion may be proffered then that, in general, the president and the Congress are accorded wide discretion in determining the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law, given that the operation of Article VI, Section 26(2) primarily affects the manner by which they are able to perform their duties of crafting and executing laws.30 As held by the Court in Pimentel, the president's decision to certify a bill is a matter of policy, in which the president exercises their full and binding discretionary power.31 The Court cannot overrule the wisdom of either the president or the Congress and substitute its own.32 It is enjoined by the long-standing principle of separation of powers to give due deference and respect to the exercise of a constitutional prerogative by a co-equal branch of government, absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction.33 Nevertheless, when the determination of the existence of the immediate necessity to pass a law is clearly lacking in basis, or when the perceived calamity or emergency fails to justify the haphazard passage of a law or is grossly disproportionate to the impact that expediting the legislative process would have on the soundness of the law in question, then the Court can step in to review and declare the existence of grave abuse of discretion. This is , because, in these cases;the impact of the immediate enactment of the law goes 28 G.R. Nos. 274778, 275405 & 276233, December 3, 2025 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc]. 29 Id. at 49. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website. 30 See Tolentino v. Secretary ofFinance, 305 Phil. 686 (1994) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 31 Pimentel v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 274778, 275405 & 276233, December 3, 2025 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc] at 47. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website. 32 Id. at 49. 33 Id.