271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurrence and Dissent Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier — Official PDF

Concurrence and Dissent 4 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 The ponencla sustains these d1allenges in part. Without pretense, I agree v.ith that result for the reasons stated below . . Nevertheless, I add . my own observations. on why the Constitutional infirmities found by the Court should not, at this stage, be paired with a present finding that the operative fact doctrine already applies. Concurrence: The Invalidity of the Challenged Unprogrammed Fund Provisions The constitutional . ceiling on appropriations recorilmended by the President may not be 'increased Section 25(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Go_veIT1ment as specified in the budget." The Court has •Jong recognized that the power of the purse, while textually lodged in Congress, is subject to this specific ceiling once the President has submitted the anriual buq.get. Congress may reduce, realign, or refuse items within the President's recommended appropriations; it may not, however, increase the aggregate ceiling the President has proposed, whether for programmed or unprogrammed items, because the Constitution draws no distinction between the two categories for this purpose. Unprogrammed appropriations and SAGF, precisely because they are, by their nature, standby appropriations releasable only upon the occurrence of specified contingencies-such as the collection of revenues in excess of targets, the enactment of new revenue measures, or the availability of newly- approved foreign loan proceeds-do not escape this ceiling merely because they are not immediately demandable. A ceiling that can be breached by resort to a contingent fund is no ceiling at all. Therefore, I agree that a bicameral conference committee, whose mandate is limited to reconciling disagreeing provisions between the House and Senate versions of the general 'appropriations bill, exceeds its authority when it inserts, in the guise of reconciliation, "'ll increase in unprogrammed appropriations and SAGF that neither chamber's version contemplated and that breaches the ceiling set by the· President's recommendation. This is consistent with the teachings of the Court that appropriation measures,