271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurrence and Dissent Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier — Official PDF

Concurrence and Dissent G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 however broad Congress's rliscretion, remain- bound by the specific limitations the Constitution itself imposes on t.½.at discretion.2 The dilution of release conditionalities converts a contingent fund into a discretionary one Equally infirm, in my view, are the provisions that dispens~d with, or _sub~tantially loosened, the _conditions historically _ required before unptogrammed appropriations and SAGF may be released, such as a certification from the Bure~u of Treasury or the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) that the relevant revenue or borrowing contingency has actually materialized. Unprogrammed appropriations and SAGF were conceived as a safety valve, not a second general fund, Removing the conditions that confine their release to genuine contingencies effectively converts them into a discretionary, lurrip-sum appropriation at the disposal of whoever controls their release.;..-an arrangement this Court has already found constitutionally intolerable in analogous contexts. In Belgica v. Ochoa,3 the Court struck down the priority development assistance fund precisely because it allowed legislators to identify projects after the appropriation had already been enacted into law, a practice this Court • held to be an impermissible intrusion into the execution of the budget.4 In Araullo v. Aquino 111,5 this Court likewise invalidated the cross- border augmentation of appropriations and the treatment of unreleased or unobligated allotments as "savings" for having circumvented the restrictions of Section 25( 5), 6 Article VI of the Constitution. 7 The provisions here under review present the same essential vice: they allow a nominally contingent, standby fund to be treated, in substance, as an unconditional one. 2 See Pimentel Ill v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 274778, 275405 & 276233, December 3, 2025 [Per J. Lazaro~Jav!er, En Barze] '-1-i 51-107. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded in the Supreme Comt website. 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. 4 I'd at 594-595. • - 5 737 Phi!. 457 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].- _ CONST!., art. VI, sec. 25(5) provides: No law shall be passed authorizing any tra'1Sfer of appropdat10ns; however, the President, the PreSident of ihe Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representat1ves, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads uf Ccnstitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations la\V for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respeciive appropriations. 7 737 Phil. 457, 603-608 (20_14) [Per J. Bersamin, £;1 Banc].