271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurrence and Dissent Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier — Official PDF

Concurrence and Dissent 7 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472, and E-04036 amounts were released, to whi<.:h agencies or programs, and to what extent obligations we.re already incurred or disbursements already made; and third, some basis for weighing thtl hardship of imdoing those specific acts against the public interest served by enforcing the constitutional limitation that was . violated. Absent these, the doctrine is invoked in the abstract, which is to say it is not truly applied at all, Thus, with utmost respect and due consideration of the ponencia's depth of analysis, the discussion of the Constitutional infirmity of the unprogrammed appropriations and SAGF provisions, however immensely sound and well-reasoned as far as it goes, does not identify with the same degree of definiteness the universe of disbursements, obligations, or releases made pursuant to those provisions; which of these were merely appropriated as opposed to fully obligated or disbursed; the specific agencies, programs, or projects that actually received such releases; or the particular parties, public ' . whose reliance. is said .to warrant protection. officers or private beneficiaries,. . . . Without these particulars;J do .not see how. the Court can, at this time, respond with any confidence to the very question the doctrine poses, i.e., whether the good that would come from letting these consequences stand outweighs the bad that would come from undoing them. That is mi empirical and equitable judgment, not a legal presumption, and it cannot responsibly be made in the abstract. I am mindful that good faith on'the part of the public officers involved -the Chief Executive in approving the GAAs, the DBM in releasing the funds, and the implementing agencies in disbursing them-is presumed, both under the general presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and under the permutations of this principle articulated in jurisprudence such as Arias v. Sandiganbayan. 13 .. But that presumption is disputaole, nqt com:;lusive, and it answers a different question from the one the operative fact doctrine asks. The presumption of good faith tells us how to treat the individual officer absent contrary proof-it does not, by itse(f, tell us whether the specffic consequences of an already executed, unconstitutional appropriation should be allowed to stand as a matter of equity. Treating the presumption of good faith as if it were itself the equitable finding the doctrine requires collapses two distinct inquiries into one, and does 13 259 Phil. 794 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc). 1