271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Dissenting Opinion: Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. — Official PDF

Dissenting Opinion G.R.Nos.271059,271347 E-02472 & E-04036 The Government cannot avoid constitutional limitations by enacting broad ceilings instead of definite appropriations. Othe!-"Wise, Congres:' col!ld place most of the nationalbudget in a single contingent pool and allow the Executive to distribute it throughout the year. Such a system would formally preserve an appropriations law while effectively transferring the power of the purse to the Executive. The Constitution does not permit that result. The power of the purse is not merely the power to authorize a maximum amount. It includes the responsibility to decide, through legislation, the objects, limits, and priorities ofpublic spending. The record confirms th_at the mechanism of unprogrammed appropriations has changed in scale and function. It now covers numerous purposes, broad lump- sum headings, programmed projects moved into contingent status, and new projects introduced after the fiscal plan was prepared. Prior cases involving narrower mechanisms cannot immunize this expanded system from review. Longstanding practice is relevant but not controlling. Repetition cannot amend the Constitution, and constitutional error does not become valid through tolerance. There is no better time than now to decisively strike down unprogrammed appropriations as unconstitutional. Special appropriations offer the constitutionally safer mechanism. A remedy exists under the Constitution. Article VI, Section 25(4)37 of the Constitution requires a special appropriations bill to specify its purpose and to be supported either by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer or by funds to be raised through a corresponding revenue proposal. This specific provision reveals the Constitution's preferred safeguard for spending outside the regular financed budget. When additional resources arise, Congress may enact a supplemental or special appropriation identifying the precise object and amount. The National Treasurer may certify availability. The President may propose supplemental or deficiency appropriations under Section 11, Chapter 3, Book VI of the Administrative Code and may certify an urgent measure when necessary. Congress then deliberates and enacts, and the Presidentretainstht; item veto. This procedure does not prevent flexibility. It subjects flexibility to law. Administrative inconvenience cannot justify bypassing constitutional safeguards. Congress can act quickly when a measure is genuinely urgent, as we expect them to do. The solution to delay is an efficient legislative process, not the transfer of legislative judgment to the Executive. The special appropriations 37 Sec. 25 .... (4) A special appropiiations bill shall specify the pu!J)OSe for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.