271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Dissenting Opinion: Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. — Official PDF

Dissenting Opinion 11 G.R.Nos.271059,271347 E-02472 & E-04036 process also produces a clearer chain of accountability. The public can know how much additional money became available, where it came from, what project will receive it, and why that project was selected, Under broad unprogrammed appropriations, these decisions may emerge through administrative release orders months after the GAA has been enacted. Unchecked broad discretion without 'Safeguards breeds' abuse. The Constitution does not assume that every public officer will act improperly, nor does it depend solely on good faith. It divides power because even well intenti.oned discretion may be mistaken, inconsistent, or, unfortunately, influenced by improper considerations. The present record demonstrates the risks. Programmed appropriations were reduced while the total programmed budget remained substantially unchanged. Major transportation projects were moved into unprognunmed appropriations. Broad social and infrastructure funds were enlarged, Htmdreds ofbillions of pesos were later released through administrative instruments. The controversy involving public works and flood control projects are perfect examples. Such a system weakens transparency at the decisive stage. Legislators and the public see broad headings during enactment, but the actual projects, amounts, and recipients may appear only after the GAA has taken effect. Accountability is also blurred. Congress may claim that it-merely established a ceiling, while the Executive may claim that it merely implemented the law. Yet the most important allocation choices may have been made by neither branch in the constitutionally required form, Responsibility becomes difficult to locate precisely because the GAA was left incomplete. This is why the Constitution demands an appropriation made by law. Public deliberation, bicameral approval, presentment, execution, and audit are not technical steps. They are constitutional safeguards against the concentration and concealment of fiscal power. Conclusion The Constitution does not permit Congress to enact an incomplete budget and leave the most important spending choices to be made by the Executive after enactment. The power of the purse includes the duty to decide, through the GAA, the amount, purpose, priority, and conditions of public expenditure. While the Constitution authorizes the Executive to implement the budget, it does not authorize the Executive to complete the budget. The 4istin_ction is fundamental. Execution means carrying out a decision already made by Congress. Unprogrammed appropriations, as presently designed, allow the Executive to decide after enactment which programs will receive funds, which projects will be delayed, which will be denied funding, and how much each project will