271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Dissenting Opinion: Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. — Official PDF

Dissenting Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347 E-02472 & E-04036 DISSENTING OPINION KHO,JR.J.: The Constitution carefully disperses governmental power so that liberty and acGountability do not depend-upon the restraint of a-single branch. Separation of powers is not absolute isolation, but a functional allocation of authority, reinforced by checks and balances. Each great department of government is confined to its assigned sphere, while the Judiciary marks constitutional boundaries when one branch exceeds them. The Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes the powers of the several departments and entrusted the courts with the duty of maintaining those boundaries. 1 In fiscal affairs, those boundaries must be exacting because control of public money-the power of the purse-is among the most consequential powers of government. Such power belongs principally to Congress.2 As such, Congress has the authority to raise public revenue and decide how pubEc money will be spent. It includes the power to impose taxes, authorize public borrowing, appropriate money for definite public putposes, and examine how the appropriated funds were used. The power is, therefore, more than a financial function. It is also an important means of democratic control because it allows the legislature to set""national priorities, restrain unnecessary spending, and hold the Executive accountable. 3 The power of the purse is ultimately a public trust. Its putpose is not simply to divide government money among offices, regions, or projects, but to ensure that limited public resources are used lawfully, transparently, and for genuine public needs. Appropriations become constitutionally suspect if they leave both the actual amount and the actual purpose to be chosen later by an implementing official without adequate legislative standards.4 In our case, the power of the purse operates within a constitutionally ordered process. Article VII, Section22 of the 1987 Constiiution5 requires the President to submit a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (I 936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 2 , See Ar((ullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457 (2014). [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. See also Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 305 Phil. 546,566 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc]. See Belg/ca v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas Bernabe, En Banc]. See also Bertiz Ill v. Medialdea, 930 Phil. I 127 (2022) [Per J. Zalameda, En Banc]. 4 Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 273 Phil. 443 (1991) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc]. See also Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 912 (1936) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc]. . 5 Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the openmg of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.