271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Dissenting Opinion: Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. — Official PDF

Dissenting Opinion 3 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347 E-02472 & E-04036 existing and proposed revenue measures. Article VI, Sections 246 and 25(1)7 of the Constitution also require appropriation bills to 01iginate in the House of Representatives, with the Senate proposing or concurring with amendments and prohibit Congress from increasing the appropriations recommended by the President for government operations. Moreover, Article VI, Section 29(1)8 of the Constitution permits payment from the Treasury only pursuant to an appropriation made by law. Furthermore, Article VI, Section 27(2)9 of the Constitution preserves the President's item veto power, while Article IX-D, Section 210 subjects public funds to audit by the Commission on Audit. Section 24, 11 Chapter 4, Book VI of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code requires that when Congress reduces the proposed appropriation for a project or program, a co1Tesponding reduction must be made in the total appropriation of the department and in the total GeneralAppropriations Bill. The Court has repeatedly -enforced this allocation. 12 The governing principle is that Congress must make the essential allocation by law through the general appropriation act (or GAA), while the Executive implements, rather than completes, that allocation. Where hundreds of billions of pesos are involved, constitutional safeguards must become stronger, not weaker. While flexibility is useful, it is not itself a constitutional value. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority ruling that unprogrammed appropriations are not unconstitutional per se. I explain. Antecedents These consolidated cases challenge the GAAs for fiscal years 2024, 2025, an9- 202.6 and require the <;::oµrt to define the constitutjonal limits .governing .the preparation, enactment, classification, and implementation of appropriations, particularly, unprogrammed appropriations. 6 Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or ~oncur with amendments. 7 Sec. 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. Sec. 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Sec. 27 ... _ (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. 10 The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining t_o, the Governincnt, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: .... 11 Sec. 24 24. Prohibition Against the Increase of Appropriation. - The Congress shall in no case increase the appropriation of any project or program of any department, bureau, agency or office of t~e G_ovemment over the amount submitted by the President- in his budget proposal. In case of any reduction m the proposed appropriation for a project.or program, a conesponding_reduction shall be made in th~ t?tal ap.P~?priation.of the department, office, or agency concerned and in the total of the General Appropnatwns Bill. (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Administrative Code of 1987). 12 Demetria v. Alba, 232 Phil. 222 0 987) [Per J. Fem~n, En Banc].