271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Dissenting Opinion: Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. — Official PDF

Dissenting Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347 E-02472 & E-04036 In my considered view, the constitutional danger identified in Belgica does not disappear merely because post enactment discretion is exercised by the Executive instead of individual legislators. The principle in Belgica reaches any an·angement in which essential appropriation decisions are made outside the GAA. If the Executive selects projects, fixes priorities among broad purposes, and determines the amount each project will receive after enactment, the identity of the actor changes but the constitutional defect identified in Belgica does not. The constitutional injury is the transfer of an essential spending choice away from Congress acting through law and giving it to the Executive. If the Executive must still select projects, determine actual amounts; and establish priorities among unrelated purposes under the unprogrammed appropriations, then the GAA is not complete. It is an unconstitutionalframeworkforjuture executive allocation. Executive discretion over unprogrammed appropriations is allocative, not merely administrative. Budget execution inevitably requires discretion, but not all discretion is the smne. Administrative discretion concerns the timing, manner, and practic'al details of implementing a policy and purpose already fixed by Congress. On the other hand, allocative discretion concerns whether a project will receive funding, how competing public purposes will be ranked, and how much each will obtain. The former executes a legislative decision, whereas the latter makes the decision. The Court held that a valid delegation must satisfy both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. The law must state the policy to be carried out and must provide sufficiently definite limits to guide the delegate.34 In one case, the Court sustained automatic appropriations for debt service because the amount due was objectively determinable from existing obligations. The Executive did not choose the object or amount of expenditure. It simply paid principal, interest, taxes, and normal banking charges as they became due.35 Unprogrammed appropriations are materially different. Where several competing programs are listed and the available contingent revenue is insufficient to cover all of them, the Executive will decide which program will be funded, and which will not. The GAA is therefore incomplete in the point that matter$. most. It does not finally resolve the allocation of scarce public resources. Thus, present system on unprogrammed appropriati~ns fails the .co~npleteness and sufficient standard tests. The fiscal triggers determine only whether additional spending authority may become available. They do not necessarily determine which among 3•1 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965, 974 (1965) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]. See also Guinto v. Department ~fJustice, 952 Phil. 401, 422-423 (2024) [Per J. Singh, En Banc]. 35 Guingona, Jr. v, Carague, 273 Phil. 443 (1991) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].