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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Dissenting Opinion: Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. — Official PDF
271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion
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DIGITAL P. 9 / 12
Dissenting Opinion 9 G:R. Nos. 271059, 271347
E-02472 & E-04036
several programs will be funded, in what order, or in what amount. When available
revenues are not enough to fund all listed purposes, the Executive must make those
choices as to which programs will proceed and which will remain unfunded. That
choice is an allocative judgment concerning national priorities, not a ministerial
act of budget execution. The Executive is no longer merely ascertaining a fact. It
is selecting national priorities which the Constitution entrusted to Congress.
I also find the SAGIP unconstitutional because one large amount could fund
numerous unrelated purposes later selected by the Executive. It correctly
concludes that this arrangement contains a prohibited post enachnent identification
feature.36 In my view, the same constitutional concern of the ponencia ia SA GIP
exists more broadly in unprogrammed appropriations.
A rule stating that funds may be used when excess revenues, new revenues,
or approved foreign loans arise answers only the question of when some spending
authority may be activated. It does not adequately answer the following questions:
Which specific project must first receive the new funds?
How are several competing projects to be ranked?
What amount is each project entitled to receive?
May all available revenues be used for a single project?
May a project included under programmed appropriations also receive
unprogrammed funding?
What happens when expected programmed revenues fall short while one
non-taxfevenue source exceeds its individual target? • ' • •
May the Executive fund unprogrammed projects while programmed
appropriations remain unsupported?
These are not insignificant details. They concern the substance of the
Government's spending policy.
The absence of binding priority rules under unprogrammed appropriations
allows the Executive to substitute its own judgment for that of Congress. A general
reference to "priority projects, " "infrastructure, " "social programs, " or
"implementation-ready projects" does not meaningfully restrain discretion.
Almost every government project can be described as a public priority. A standard
broad enough to embrace virtually everything provides no effective standard at all.
36 Ponencia, p. 69.
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