271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 11 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 & E-04036 That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court, which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440; was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President • as urgent. The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights ofindiv1duals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.53 (Citations omitted) In Atty. Calleja v. Executive Secretary lvfedialdea,54 this Court, citing Tolentino and Ahas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,55 held that the President's determination of the existence of an "emergency" or "public . calamity" is fundamentally dependent on the exigencies of each circumstance, and due deference should be accorded to the President's justification m certifying a bill as urgent, thus: In Tblentin, > v. Secretary df Finance (Tolentino), the Court held that: The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of m&."tial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification ofbills, which involves doing away with procedurnl requirements desiJned to insure that bills are dulv considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. Based on the fiwegoing, it can be surmised that the President's detenninu,tion of ,he e:,J;tence ,:,_( rm "emergeri.cy". or "public calamity" is fitndanienially dep,Cndent on the e.¼:igencies o..feach circumstance. In Ahas Kida v. Sanate of the Philippines, the Court upheld the certification of the PresideD.i fOr the immediate cnact1nent of R.A. ·No. 1O153, a law synchrnnizirig the pR_.l\,fM elections with the national and local elections. In justifying ilie cer'.ification of the urgency of the bilL the Cou.rt explained inter alia that: 53 Id. at 744-746, 54 918-B Phil. i (2021) [Per J. Carandang, En Banc]. 55 675 Phil. 116 (201 l) [Per J. Brion,"'" Ban"1.