271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 17 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 & E-04036 President for approval. The President reviews the GAB, arid prepares the Veto Message where budget items are subjected to direct veto, or are identified for conditional implementation.71 (Citations omitted) After the enactment of the GAA, budget implementation starts with the release of funds to the agencies as stated in the GAA.72 This phase is primarily • within the jurisdiction of the DBM, which petfotms the following functions: (1) issue the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2) prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) release allotments; and (4) issue disbursement authorities.73 In this regard, this- Court has held that once legislated, the Executive implements the provisions of the GAA, and unless the Constitution provides otherwise, exclusively exercises all roles and prerogatives in relation to it. 74 Meanwhile, the • final phase of the budget process involves accountability measures designed to assess the performance of implementing agencies during the fis~al year, with the purpose of implementing reforms and new policies. Particularly, accountability of implementing agencies is examined and evaluated through: "(1) perfonnance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3) review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit."75 The 'Congress's power oj the purse The authority of Congress to legislate the annual budget emanates from Article VI, Section 29, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, thus: Section 29. 1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. ! Kno,vn as control over the "power of the purse," this provision mandates that all ~xpenses of the government be'supported by an authority contained in a law( On this not!, while Congress's power over appropriation measures is ' plenary, its exercike is nonetheless ¢ircttmscrfoed by the Constitution itself, which designed th~ budget-making process as a shared responsibility between the executive _and the le_gislative ~epa~1ents, owing to the unique and distinct nature of their redpect1ve fLL'lCt10ns. 1 nus, as a fonn of check and balance 71 Id 548-549. I 72 The Budgeting Procfss, DBM Website. https:/rvvvvw.dbm.gov.ph1v.rp-content/uploads/2012/03/PGB- B2.pc1f, lastaccessedlon October.!2, 2024. 73 Arau/lo v. President )j.quino 111, 737 Phi1. 457, 5:>0 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. 7-4 Belgica v. Hon. Exec~ Sec. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416. 536 (2013) [!er Cu~iam, En Banc]. 75 Araul!o v. President )!,.quino Jjf, 737 Phil. -157, 552 ()iJ 14) [Per J Ber.sa!TiffJ. En Banc]. I