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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez — Official PDF

271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion

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DIGITAL P. 20 / 36
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 20 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 & E-04036 particular church, 84 but does not restrict the use of public property for religious purposes, the character of which use is merely incidental to a temporary use available indiscriminately to the public in genera!.85 Meanwhile, under Article VI, Section 25(4) of the Constitution, "[ a] special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended ' and shall be supported by funds actually available'as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein." This is because the Philippines implements an annual budgeting system that requires all priority programs and activities of the government and all implementing agencies for a given fiscal year to be taken into account in the legislation of the national budget. Any subsequent project or program not included in the GAA of !:he fiscal year must be financed through funds not allocated for other purposes, or to be generated. The Constitution also generally prohibits the transfer of appropriations. Article VI, Section 25( 5) of the Constitution provides: Section 25. 5. No law shall be. passed authorizing- any. transfer .of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions· may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items oftheir respective appropriations. This provisfon is intended 1o ensure iha! the funds allocated by Congress for specific purpo~es •are no.t arbitrarily redirected. The only exception is that the President, Jhe Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may be authorized by law to use savings from one item in their respective budgets to augment another item within their own office's appropriations. It is designed to provide flexibility in budget execution while preventing unauthorized or discretionary fund transfers. Arguably the most substantial limitation to the exercise of Congress of its power of the purse i's the Presio.ent's explicit authority to veto items or lines in appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills under Article VI, Section 27(2) of the Constitution, which provides: 84 Re: Letter ofTony Q. Vu.lenciana Holding of'Religious Rit"da!s at the Hall of.Justice Bldg. in QC, 806 Phii. 822, 853 (2017) [Per J. Me"doza, En Banc]. 85 Id.