271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 33 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, '.' I ' E-02472 & E-04036 complete the funding of programmed appropriations, increasing the total deficit in the process. 119 Apparently, the government's reaction to the ruling in Araullo was to rephrase the wording of the relevant provision in the succeeding GAAs, such that unprogrammed appropriations may be avdled when there are excess revenue collections in any one of the identified non-tax revenue sources from its corresponding revenue target, effectively disregarding this Court's pronouncement that unprogrammed appropriations should be released only when revenue collections exceed the total original revenue targets. As the ponencia accurately held, this type of fiscal trigger for unprogrammed appropriations is void not only for being violative of Article VII,' Section 22, but also for being violative of the principle of separation of powers, as it repudiates this Court's interpretation in Araullo. The prohibition against Congress to increase the appropriations recommended by the President in the budget, as mandated by Article VL Section 25(1) ofthe Constitution, does not apply to line-item or individual PAPs. I want to proffer the view that the prohibition against Congress to increase the appropriations recommended by the President in the budget as mandated by Article VI, Section 25(1) of the Constitution, does not apply to line-item or individual P APs. In Sarmiento v. Treasurer of the Philippines, 120 this Court held that giving the Congress an unbridled hand in passing upon the appropriations recommended by the President, as specified in the budget, may lead to big budget deficits. Thus, the constitutional prohibition ensures that the government's expected income will be sufficient for the operational expenses of its different agencies and projects specified in the appropriations law. This Court nevertheless clarified that since the objective is to prevent a budget deficit, Article VI, Section 25(1) of the Constitution should be read as enjoining Congress frori:1 increasing the total budget for the operation of the government as recommended by t½.e President, but not the individual items of appropriations, which is ultimately within its prerogative of allocating the budget to different agencies and projects. ;21 l 19 TSN,April21~2026,pp.~5-!04. . , . . , . . , , ' 120 ci'.R. Nos. 125680 and 126313, September 4, 2001, Unsigned Resolution, [En Banc]. 121 Id.