271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 34 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 & E-04036 Indeed, the Congress has the power to decide how the budget will be spent, particularly by choosing which P APs to fund and how much to spend on each PAP. 122 In this regard, the Congress can even decide how detailed or ' broad a project or activity can be. 123 This includes the. power to increase funding for individual PAP. Thus, I am also of the view that the increases in the allotted an10unts of Special Accounts in the General Fund under the Special Provisions of the departments/agencies, as well as the Special Road Fund in the 2025 GAA were valid exercises of the Congress's power of the purse. In the exercise of t.'iis authority, ii is my submission that Congress has the authority to transfer appropriations from prcgrammed to unprogrammed and vice versa, subject again to the ceiiings provided in the NEP. This has been the institutional practice, and understandably so. In our jurisdiction, "[t]he power to appropriate public ·funds for the maintenance of the government and other public needs distinctively belongs to Congress."124 Known as control over the "power of the purse," this means that.all expenses of the government. be supported by arr authority contained in a law. Because of th.e nature and extent of this grant of power, it may be "regarded as the most complek and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people."125 Indeed, giving Congress the power to determine and authorize public spending allows the people, through their representatives, to participate in the implementation of national projects and contribute to policy furtherance, In many ways, the power of the purse is also a way to control executive spending, to the end that the purse and sword are not centralized. 126 Needless to say, the budget approved by Congress is still, in turn, subject to the veto poi.ver of the f>resident, who may directly veto an item or line in the GAB or mand<'l.te conditional implementation for some of its provisions. This veto power reinforces the executive's role in the budgetary process by enabling the President to ensure that the GAA remains aligned with national policy objectives. At this juncture, it bears stressing that the recent controversy involving unprogramrned appropriations, including the unprecedented increase of unprogrammed oppr0priation!) a~ approved in the GAA compared to that proposed of the President in the N"'EP, and serious allegations of its improper release and utilization, pegs inquiry into fiscal responsibility and 122 Arauit; v. President AqUino Ill, 737 ?hiL 457, $84(2014) [Per J. Bersati1in, En Banc]. 21 ' Philippine Cor,Stitution AssoClatidtf v. Enrtque::, 305 Pb.il. 5461 566-(1994) [Per J· Quiason, En Banc]. 121 Congressman 1\1andanas v. I~:x:e0'. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., 835 Phil. 97. 240 (2018) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. 125 Neal Devins, Budge; Rfcfarm and the Balance of Powers,vo!ume 31, WM. & MARYL. REV; 993 (1~90 available at httos.//scho!arshin.law.wm.edu/wmlr,'vol3 l/iss4J5, last accessed on October 1, 2025 c1tmg THE FEI'E'.Ri,t.IS·1;·Ne. 58) at 3()0 l]. Madison) (Tvi Bdoff ed. 1987). Q 126 Id. • • C