271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036  Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 271059, 271347, E-02472 & E-04036 spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the imp;ementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, :to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.32 (Citations omitted, emphasis in .the origipal) Evidently, this case presents a justiciable controversy. As to the second element, petitioners have locus standi. In Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on Elections,33 this Court defined legal standing as follows: [Locus standi or legal standing is defined as] a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term '"interest'' means a material interest, an interest in iss\je affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.34 { citation omitted) Meanwhile, in Ifurung v. Carpio Morales,35 this Court discussed the instances when it may adopt a liberal stance in interpreting locus standi, thus: To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with waterial interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rufo on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of tran.~cendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs. such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a laV\1 or &'1y othfcr government µct, In Df!Vid, t.½.e Court laid out the bare minimum nonn before the so-calicd ''non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thusly: 1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 32 Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phii. 388, 441-444 (2019) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc]. 33 740 Phil. 472 (2014) [Per J. Ca.-cplo, En Banc}. •14 Id at 481. 35 83 ! Phil. 135 (2018) [Per J. Mmtireo, En Banc].