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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion

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DIGITAL P. 13 / 37
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 13 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 appropriation for foreign-assisted projects which were still under negotiations, or were not yet approved during the national budget preparations, but were highly likely to be implemented within the ensuing fiscal year. 27 By providing an approp1iation cover, UAs address the risk of costly project delays and the . acc~al of commitrne1;1t fees due to ,the. strict. COD;Stitutional requirement that "no' money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."28 While UAs have been identified in the 1987 BESF, it was only in 1989 when UAs were included as a separate item in the GAA. From then, UAs have been a consistent feature in the GAAs, eventually evolving to provide contingent spending authority for a multitude of big-ticket PAPs. Their present form has been justified as "fiscal buffers" which enable the government to "respond to unforeseen needs or urgent national priorities without breaching the fiscal program approved by Congress."29 They allow the Executive Department to utilize excess available funds for pre-authorized purposes, without the need of a supplemental budget legislation. The development ofUAs as a fiscal instrument, however, has created a paradox. A contingency budget presupposes the existence of a reserved • amount for unknown and unexpected expenditures. U As; on the other hand, itemize the expenditures in advance. The m1certainty lies not in the items to be funded, but in their financing. In this sense, UAs technically contain planned or "programmed" expenditures. The sheer expansion of UAs, reaching a peak of PHP 807 .2 billion in the 2023 GAA, has also negated their original nature as mere standby appropriations. UAs have even surpassed the programmed appropriations for key national government agencies delivering critical and frontline public services such as the Department of Health. Under the 2023 GAA, the Department of Education was allocated the highest budget of PHP 924.7 billion, closely followed by the Department of Public Works and Highways with PHP 822.2 billion. The Department of Health was allocated PHP 306.1 billion. This has raised pointed questions on fiscal discipline. Substantial UAs • mean that the government is largely nnable to nfatch its projected revenues with its socioeconomic development agenda. Funding UAs through loans also increases the budget deficit. Contrary to the argument that UAs are deficit- neutral since they are designed to be expended outside the government's 27 TSN, Amicus Be1tjarnin Diokno, April 7, 2026, pp. 40-41. 28 CONST., art. VI, sec. 29(1), 29 Department of Budget and Management, DBM chief: Unprogrammed funds key to sustain gov 't social protection program," releases P5-B for AJCS beneficiaries, October 15, 2015, available at https://www.dbm,gov.ph/inde1cpbp/management-2/3644-dbm-chief-unprogrammed-funds-key-to- sustain-gov-t-social-protection-program-releases-p5-b-for-aics-beneficiaries