271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 19 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 Each UA item, therefore, must have a discernible purpose. It must be tied to a specific PAP with a corresponding amount. Its expenditure, if pen11itted by the conditions, must be directly traceable to the appropriation law itself. It should not be subject to post-enactment discretionary,.allocation, nor allow the President to dete1mine its utilization in a manner tliat violates , the :principle ofnon-d~legation of legislative power.. , Notwithstanding, the President is not precluded from introducing valid lump sum amounts in the UA. As held in the subsequent case of Belgica v. Hon. Executive Secretary, 51 for as long as the lump sum amount is meant as a funding source for multiple PAPs tl1at may all be clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose, i.e., the lump sum satisfies ilie standard of singular correspondence, then ilie lump sum appropriation is valid. For exan1ple, the President may propose that the Calamity Fund or the Intelligence Fund, which the Court has considered to be valid lump sum appropriations, be included in the UA. Thus, these kinds of lmnp sum appropriations may validly be proposed and enacted as part of the UA. Based on such standard, I agree with the ponencia that the Strengiliening Assistance for Government Infrastructure and Social Progran1s (SAGIP), a UA item found in the 2024 and 2025 GAAs, is unconstitutional. , Through the SA GIP, Congress appropriated a single funding source for broad, multiple purposes, which allowed the Executive branch to determine the particular projects or activities to be funded. As can be gleaned from ilie list of SAROs submitted by the OSG, the funds appropriated for SAGIP have, in fact, been utilized for various unrelated purposes-from the implementation of a census monitoring system to financial assistance to rice farmers. Second, UAs must not violate the constitutionally-mandated budget ceiling. Classifying an appropriation as "unprogrammed" does not and should not take it outside the constitutional framework which demands fiscal discipline. Conditional authority to spend is still authority to spend. To detennine if the UA violates the budget ceiling, it is necessary to define what constitutes the budget ceiling. Since the Constitution does not supply its definition, it is necessary to contextualize it in the budget process, particularly in the budget preparation docum~nts ,sub1pitted by the President ' to Congress. , • ' " 864 Phil. 46 I, 499 (2019) [Per Curiam, En Banc].