271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 Promulgated: X CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION SINGH,J.: The "power of the purse" is undoubtedly vested in Congress. However, the Constitution does not grant that power in absolute terms and without qualification. This case presents an opportunity for the Court to define and delineate that power within the limits set forth by the Constitution. I concur in the ponencia that Unprogrammed Appropriations (UAs) are not per se unconstitutional. However, I differ in the characterization ofUAs. It is my studied opinion that they are, in view of their contingent nature as standby authority, advanced enactments of a supplemental or special appropriation. As a form of advanced supplemental or special appropriation, it is , subject of its own budget ceiling. This means that Congress may not move line items from the prograID1ned to the unprogrammed portions as they pertain to two distinct and separate budgets. The Special Provisions that would trigger the release of UAs should be read in light of the constitutional provisions on supplemental or special appropriations. On this score, I also agree with the ponencia that: (a) Special Provision I (a), Chapter XLIII, of the 2026 GAA is unconstitutional for authorizing the release of funds for UAs in case there are excess revenue collections "in any one of the identified non-tax revenue sources from its corresponding revenue collection target, as reflected in the BESF;" and (b) the increase in the allotted amounts of SAGFs of certain agencies and departments is unconstitutional. Such acts violate the natuxe of a supplemental or special appropriation by permitting the use of funds.intended for programmed appropriations. I explain my position in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. Historical development of Congress' power of the purse and the limits of