271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 22 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 serving a different fiscal function. The programmed budget concerns expenditures intended to be undertaken under the ordinary fiscal program. The UA concerns expenditures· that may be undertaken only upon the realization of additional financing. Consequently, t;here are i'No corresponding.ceilings.that must be looked into: one ceiling for programmed appropriations, and another one for the UA. This is the logical conclusion considering that UAs do not have a definite financing source as compared to programmed appropriations. Precisely, the source of funding for the UA is not included in the projected earnings of the Govern1nent as they are, as discussed, contingent on the happening of certain circumstances. Invariably, UAs are not computed in the total appropriations provided for in the BESF. Applying the matching principle,52 where costs directly associated with the revenue of a particular period are properly allocable to that period, then the UA cannot be included in the total spending cap proposed by the President with respect to programmed appropriations. Again, no identifiable and specific revenue source can be matched to a contingent spending under the UA. Nevertheless, the UA has a budget ceiling within its own sphere as it is • a form of supplemental ·or special apptopriation 'in itself: The total amount proposed by the President in the NEP for the UA is considered as the budget ceiling for the UA. This interpretation preserves the nature of the UA as a separate spending authority, and allows Congress to exercise oversight based on the cap proposed by the President in the NEP. Notwithstanding the UA's own budget ceiling, there is another effective linlit in how funds in the UA may be disbursed, that is, the excess available funds under the disposal of the government as certified by the National Treasurer. In other words, another limit of the UA is the actual excess funds certified by the National Treasurer. The DBM cannot release funds in excess of how nmch the National Treasurer has certified. To do so would go against Article VI, Section 25(4) of the Constitution. This mechanism does not unduiy restrict Congress' power of the purse. Congress continues to possess broad authority to determine the contents of the appropriations law. \Vithin the programmed envelope, it may increase one , line, ite1n and reduce another, delete proposed items,'or create new ones. It may likewise modify the individual items within the UAs. The President's line-item recommendations are not immutable. What Congress 1nay not do, however, is enlarge one fiscal spending authority by transferring appropriations from the programmed to the 52 Merten's 111e: Law of Federal Income Taxcdi.Dn, Section 12A.101, Volume 2 0 995).