271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 unprogrammed and vice versa. It bears emphasizing that the programmed and unprogrammed appropriations, though included in the single national budget submitted by the President to Congress, are separate spending authorities premised on different fiscal conditions. Thus, the line items belonging in one area cannot be moved by Congress to another in the exercise of its modified power of the purse. To do so would contravene the nature ofUAs as standby authority in the form of an advanced supplemental or special budget. This construction gives effect to both aspects of the constitutional design of shared responsibility between the Executive and Legislative Branches in the enactment of the national budget. Congress retains its broad legislative authority to determine the pri01ities and contents of GAA. The President, however, retains the constitutional prerogative to establish, through the budget submission, the fiscal boundaries within which those legislative choices must operate. This system also affords flexibility on the part of government to be able to immediately obligate funds to PAPs when there are excess funds, with the safeguard that the programmed and unprogrammed areas of the budget are separate silos that may not be comingled by Congress. The BCC's authority remains subject to the constitutional limits on appropriations The constitutional lilnits on appropriations bind every stage of the budget process, including the bicameral conference. I agree that the PHP 449.5 billion increase in.DA under the 2024 GAA cannot stand. The ground for that conclusion, however, requires precision., For the re:isons discussed above, the increase recommended by the BCC exceeded the constitutional ceiling that binds Congress itself. I respectfully dissent, however, from the ponencia's further holding that the BCC was constitutionally prohibited from recommending the increase solely because the House and the Senate had agreed .on the earlier UA total. The former conclusion is consistent with Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 53 The latter narrows the doctrine recognized in that case and converts a matter of internal legislative procedure into a constitutional prohibition. The relevant facts illustrate the distinction. As the ponencia records, the House and the Senate approved the same UA level of approximately PHP 54 The President's proposal was PHP 281,908,056,000.00; the 281.9 billion. 55 enacted amount was PHP 731,448,566,000.00.56 The difference is PHP 53 305 Phil 686 (1994) [Per J. Mendoza. En Banc]. 54 Senate Committee Report No. i55, November 7, 2023. 55 See Budget olExpenditures and Sources ofFinancing FL~·cal Year 202f,.PP·. 778~779~ DEP'T_OF~UDGET &'MGMT. WEBSITE, athttps:1/www.dl:>m'.gov.ph/wp-contcni/up!oi,ds/BESF/BESF2024/BESF-2024.pdf. 56 See Summary of FY 2024 New Appropriatior.s, 119(52) 0.0. 79.1, 803 (Dec. 25, 2023), at https:/iwww.dbrn.gov.ph/wp-content/up1oads/GAftJGAA2024fVolumel/SNA.pdf.