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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion

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DIGITAL P. 26 / 37
Concurring andDissenting Opinion 26 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 absence of disagreement was itself presented to, and found insufficient by, the Court as a ground for invalidating the conference amendment. Tolentino developed this reasoning. In Tolentino, the Court recognized the authority of a conference committee to recommend provisions absent from both bills, including an amendment in the nature of a substitute, provided the amendment remained germane to their subject. The committee did not thereby become a third legislative chamber because its report still required approval by both Houses.64 The distinction was between the committee's recommendation and Congress's adoption of that recommendation. The latitude accorded to the former rested in substantial part on the legislative control retained ov"r .the latter. Equally . important, Tolentino placed responsibility for changing conference practice in Congress itself, because the 1natter concerns the internal rules of the cha1nbers rather than a procedure prescribed by the Constitution.65 The October 30, 1995 Resolution66 on reconsideration reiterated the doctrine. Citing Philippine Judges Association, the Court again recognized that conference authority extended beyond the resolution of differences and emphasized the significance of subsequent approval by the respective Houses.67 Tolentino cannot therefore fairly be read as permitting only a choice between provisions already approved, or only language necessary to bridge an identified textual disagreement. The decision recognized broader authority to propose germane amendments. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita68 did not withdraw that recognition. It explained that reconciliation may involve adopting either chamber's provision, deleting competing provisions, or arriving at a compromise. But it also expressly reaffirmed Tolentino. Its description of the committee's reconciliatory function must be read together with that reaffirmation.69 Although the changes examined in Abakada arose from actual disagreements, that factual setting does not transform the decision into a holding that provisions already agreed upon are constitutionally insulated from all conference recommendations. Abakada likewise reaffirmed that changes in conference practice should be sought in Congress and that the enforcement of its purely internal rules belongs to that body.70 These cases require more than the observation that the two chambers initially approved the same UA total. That agreement establishes the absence 64 Tolentino v. Secretary a/Finance, 305 Phil 686, 747-748 (1994) !Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 65 Id. at 751. 66 Tolentino V. Secretary ~r Finance, 319 Phil. 755 (!995) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 67 Id. at 784. 68 506 Phil. 1 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Ba,ic]. 69 jJ_ at 94-97. 10 Id. at 89--90.