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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF
271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion
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DIGITAL P. 26 / 37
Concurring andDissenting Opinion 26 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353,
E-02472 & E-04036
absence of disagreement was itself presented to, and found insufficient by, the
Court as a ground for invalidating the conference amendment.
Tolentino developed this reasoning. In Tolentino, the Court recognized
the authority of a conference committee to recommend provisions absent from
both bills, including an amendment in the nature of a substitute, provided the
amendment remained germane to their subject. The committee did not
thereby become a third legislative chamber because its report still required
approval by both Houses.64 The distinction was between the committee's
recommendation and Congress's adoption of that recommendation. The
latitude accorded to the former rested in substantial part on the legislative
control retained ov"r .the latter. Equally . important, Tolentino placed
responsibility for changing conference practice in Congress itself, because the
1natter concerns the internal rules of the cha1nbers rather than a procedure
prescribed by the Constitution.65
The October 30, 1995 Resolution66 on reconsideration reiterated the
doctrine. Citing Philippine Judges Association, the Court again recognized
that conference authority extended beyond the resolution of differences and
emphasized the significance of subsequent approval by the respective
Houses.67 Tolentino cannot therefore fairly be read as permitting only a choice
between provisions already approved, or only language necessary to bridge
an identified textual disagreement. The decision recognized broader authority
to propose germane amendments.
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita68 did not withdraw that recognition.
It explained that reconciliation may involve adopting either chamber's
provision, deleting competing provisions, or arriving at a compromise. But it
also expressly reaffirmed Tolentino. Its description of the committee's
reconciliatory function must be read together with that reaffirmation.69
Although the changes examined in Abakada arose from actual disagreements,
that factual setting does not transform the decision into a holding that
provisions already agreed upon are constitutionally insulated from all
conference recommendations. Abakada likewise reaffirmed that changes in
conference practice should be sought in Congress and that the enforcement of
its purely internal rules belongs to that body.70
These cases require more than the observation that the two chambers
initially approved the same UA total. That agreement establishes the absence
64 Tolentino v. Secretary a/Finance, 305 Phil 686, 747-748 (1994) !Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
65 Id. at 751. 66 Tolentino V. Secretary ~r Finance, 319 Phil. 755 (!995) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
67 Id. at 784.
68 506 Phil. 1 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Ba,ic].
69 jJ_ at 94-97.
10 Id. at 89--90.
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