271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 27 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 of a numerical difference to reconcile. It does not erase the chambers' subsequent adoption of the conference report. Under the doctrine as it stands, their earlier concurrence does not, by itself, disable them from approving a germane conference amendment: A contrary conclusion would treat their initial agreement as constitutionally irrevocable at the conference stage, notwithstanding the authority recognized in Tolentino and Philippine Judges Association. • There is, admittedly, a plausible distinction between introducing a provision absent from both bills and altering an express provision affirmatively approved by both Houses. The latter revisits a common legislative choice. But that distinction cannot simply be assumed to mark an established constitutional boundary. Tolentino considered the contention that the committee could act only on differences, yet sustained broader authority on the grounds of gennaneness and subsequent approval. The distinction may furnish a reason for Congress to limit the BCC's instructions. It does not, without an independent constitutional basis, justify a judicial prohibition that continues to bind the chambers even after they have adopted the recommendation as their own. Nor should the Court supply an explanation that the record does not establish. Agreement on an aggregate amount does not necessarily establish agreement on every component or condition of the appropriation. Equally, the Court cannot presume that disagreements elsewhere required this increase. The relevant point is narrower: the identical totals, standing alone, do not furnish a complete constitutional. ground for invalidation under the existing conference cases of Tolentino, Philippine Judges Association, and Abakada. TI1e substantial size of the increase demands scrutiny, but the legal prohibition must come from an applicable constitutional limitation. Article VI, Section 26(2)71 does not dispense with this doctrinal inquiry. It prescribes the readings and circulation required for bills and prohibits amendments upon the last reading. Those safeguards are binding. Yet I ' 1 ' ' • ' ' 1 ' :· • ' ' • f I Tolentino held that a conference report need not undergo another sequence of three readings,72 and Abakada reaffirmed that construction.73 The latter also explained that the prohibition on amendments upon the last reading does not foreclose the subsequent process of amendment and concurrence between the chambers. Under those decisions, the appearance of new language after the .,, CONST., art. VI, sec. 26(2) provides: No bill passed by either House, shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days .. and printed copies thereof in itsfinalfOrm have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the ye,is and nays entered in the Journal. (Emphases supplied) 72 Tolentino v. Secretary ofFinance, 305 Phil 686, 752 (1994) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 73 Abakada Guro Party U1·t v. Ermita, 506 Phil. l, 97~98 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].