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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF
271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion
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DIGITAL P. 28 / 37
Concurring and Dissenting Opini011 28 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353,
E-024 72 & E-04036
separate third readings 1s insufficient, without more, to establish a
constitutional violation.
The concern underlying a stricter rule is nonetheless substantial. A
conference report may contain consequential changes that were not separately
considered in the versions initially approved by either chamber. Its
cons,ideration as a cmnmon legislative product may reduce opportunities for
focused scrutiny. That concern carries particular weight in an appropriations
measure, where a change in a single category may authorize billions of pesos
in additional spending. The appropriate response, however, is transparency
and accountability in the conference process, not a judicially created
prohibition against revisiting every provision on which the chambers
previously agreed. Congress may adopt such a restriction as a matter of
legislative policy. The Court should not make that policy choice
constitutionally con1pulsory.
The distinction between congressional rules and constitutional
requirements is equally important. In Arroyo v. De Venecia, 74 the Court
rejected the proposition that every violation of a House rule necessarily
violates the Constitution merely because the power to adopt the rule derives
from Article VI, Section 16(3). Within constitutional bounds, a, legislative
body may modify or waive its procedural rules.75 Farinas v. Executive
Secretary76 applied the same reasoning to alleged irregularities involving
conference committees and declined to invalidate the challenged law on that
basis.77 A failure to observe an internal instruction and a breach of the
Constitution have different legal consequences. This distinction does not
withdraw legislative action fro1n review under Article VIII, Section l. 78 It
requires the Court to identify an actual constitutional transgression or
infringement of an enforceable right, rather than equate a departure from
parliamentary procedure with grave abuse of discretion.
This does not diminish the value of the reporting requirements. A clear
account of amendments enables legislators to understand what they are being
asked to approve and pennits the public to identify the changes made during
the conference. The House requirement of a detailed statement79 and the
74 343 Phil. 42 (1997) [Per J. Me-ndoza, En Banc].
75 Id. at 60-65.
76 463 Phil. 179 (2003) [Per f. Callejo, Sr.; En Banc:].'
77 id. at 210-211.
78 CONST., art. Vlll, sec. 1 provides:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts _as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the comts ofjusrice to settle acti.:ia1 controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdici.ion on the part of any branch or
instru.memality of the Gove1nment.
79 Rules of the House of Representatives, 19'h Congress, Rule X, sec. 63.
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