271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 30 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 through its own rules, consistently with the constitutional guarantees of transparency and accountability. The proposal respects, •rather than displaces, Tolentino. In its Resolution on reconsideration, the Court rejected the objection to closed conference sessions, taking account of the report disclosing the changes made, and reiterated that refonn of congressional committee procedures belongs to Congress.8:i I would preserve that allocation of authority while advocating mandatory recordkeeping. Nor would I treat the absence of minutes, by itself, as an automatic ground for invalidating a law; Farinas rejected procedural objections that included the alleged absence of conference records.84 An inadequate explanation does not necessarily establish the absence of constitutional power to enact a provision, just as a comprehensive explanation cannot supply a power withheld by the Constitution. As discussed, the programmed and unprogrammed portions proposed by the President in the NEP constitute separate spending authorities, each , enacted upon a different fiscal premise and subject to its own conditions of • availability. The former authorizes expenditures that are affim1.atively planned and funded within the regular budget ceiling, while the latter constitutes a contingent authority to incur expenditures only upon the occurrence of the conditions expressly prescribed by Congress and as certified by the National Treasurer. They are, therefore, not interchangeable components of a single undifferentiated appropriation. As such, Congress may not transfer or move an item from one to the other in a manner that alters the fiscal character and conditions under which the appropriation was authorized. To pennit such interchangeability would effectively allow one spending authority to be used to circumvent the distinct limitations imposed upon the other. The question whether Tolentino is being abandoned should accordingly be answered with reference to the precise ground of decision. Invalidating the increase for violating Article VI, Section 25(1), as applied to the separate , programmed and unprogrammed spending authorities, does not depart from Tolentino. Its doctrine on conference amendments operates within the Constitution, including the limitations peculiar to appropriations. Applying a limitation that the case did not purpo1t to remove preserves, rather than contradicts, its holding. To the extent however, that the ponencia holds that the BCC was constitutionally prohibited from recommending the increase solely because the House and the Senate had agreed on the earlier UA total, notwithstanding 83 Tolentino v_ Secretary l?.f Finance. 319 Pb.il. 755, 782-785 (199-5) [Per J. 11:endoza, En Banc]. 84 Farinas v. E"Cecutive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 208-211 (2003) fPer J. Callejo, Sr .• En Banc].