271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 31 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 their subsequent ratification, it narrows existing doctrine. I cannot join that conclusion. It qualifies the latitude recognized in Tolentino, the rejection in Philippine Judges Association of an objection based on the absence of disagreement, and the reaffirmation of the conference doctrine in Abakada. Describing the BCC as a body created to reconcile differences does not supply the constitutional basis for converting its ordinary function into an absolute limitation on the recommendations Congress may authorize or subsequently adopt. The Court En Banc has authority to modify its doctrines under Article VIII, Section 4(3). 85 The exercise of that authority should identify the rule being changed and the constitutional reason for the change. Here, I find no sufficient constitutional basis for making an earlier agreement between the cha1ubers an irrevocable limit on tl1e BCC's recommendations. Whether their conferees should be prohibited from reopening an agreed provision is a question Congress may resolve through its internal rules. The Court should enforce the constitutional liluits on what Congress ultimately enacts without prescribing an additional restriction on the means by which the chambers arrive at that enactment. There is thus no occasion to narrow Tolentino's conference doctrine, much less disturb its separate holdings on the origination of bills, the Senate's amendment power, or presidential certification. For my part, the above-discussed principle applicable to the two separate spending authorities offets·a direct :ind kufficient basis for rejecting the increase in the UA. It preserves the distinction between the procedural latitude Congress may accord the BCC and the substantive limits Congress cannot waive. It also places responsibility where it belongs. The BCC recommended the additional spending authority; the chambers adopted it. Both acted within a constitutional budget process whose limits could not be enlarged by their agree1uent. Accordingly, I concur in declaring unconstitutional the PHP 449,540,510,000.00 increase in the UA in the 2024 GAA on the substantive appropriations ground discussed above. I dissent from treating the identical House and Senate totals as an independent constitutional prohibition against the BCC's recommendation. I would retain the doctrine in Tolentino, leave the scope of the BCC's authority to Congress within consiitutio1;1al bounds, and urge Congress to require the BCC's official minutes and transcript of proceedina-s as a concrete safeguard of transparency and accountability. The ,. b .. , . , .. , , ... ' , 85 CONST., art VTI!, sec. 4(3) provides: • Cases or matters heru.-d by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concu1Tence of a majority of the Members who achmlly took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, a...-r1d in no case without the concunence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decid1::d en hanc: Providl.;'d, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down bv the court in a decision rendered en bane or in dildsion m.ay he modified or reversed except by the /ourt sitting en bane. (Emphasis supplied)