271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 33 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353, E-02472 & E-04036 programmed and unprogrammed categorizations by Congress transgresses the na.ture of the President's budgetary proposal. It is not simply a matter of arithmetic and balancing the books, but a question of enforcing the delicate constitutional balance involving the Executive Department's power to design the program of government, and the Legislative Branch's power of the purse to check and balance this proposal. I concur in the ponencia in recognizing that to allow Congress to transfer PAPs between programmed appropriations and UAs is to substitute Congressional fiat for . the tedious, but detailed and necessary, budget preparation process where the law has institutionalized greater transparency and expertise-driven planning. This unconstitutional budgetary power is similarly displayed when Congress adds new P APs devoid of the processes involved in the budget preparation phase. TI1ese new PAPs are markedly developed outside of the rigorous vetting process that produced the proposed PAPs under the . Pre~ident's budget These new PAPs therefore suffer la,ck .of financial and economic anchor within the broad frameworks of either the BESF or the NEP. They also fail to consider the corresponding absorptive capacity86 of the government agency or instrumentality which will be entrusted with additional funding for PAPs they did not propose. The wielding of such practice therefore suggests an approach by Congress to the budget process as it skips the phase of budget preparation, and all the attendant safeguards to ensure accountability and soundness. The preservation of the power of the President, through the NEP, to exclusively propose new PAPs does not shield the Executive Department from the scrutiny and fiscalizing mandate of Congress, as the legislature exercises a wide latitude of actions upon the executive proposals. On the contrary, this prohibition against the congressional creation of new PAPs prevents the abuse of the power of the purse, grounds any proposal within the confines of the budgetary phases, and enforces the constitutional design for a fisc~lly prudent budgetary process, If Congress is of the view that certain PAPs should receive public funding, nothing precludes it from participating in the budget preparation phase so that these PAPs will be included in the NEP that the President will submit to Congress. Congress may advocate for its own spending priorities during the budget preparation phase, but the formal preparation of the NEP remains with the Executive. B6 See Rosario G.! Nfanasan & Ruben G. Ivlercado, An Assessment of the Absotptive Capacity of Agencies Involved in the PublU: Work~, Sector, Philippine Institute of Devetopment Studies Discussion Paper Series No. 2001-17, p. iii. "lT]he tenn absorptive capacity ... [refers to] the ability ofan agency to maximize the use of available financial resources.''