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271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh — Official PDF
271059/271347/E-02472/E-04036 — Promulgated October 7, 2026 · 2026 · Supreme Court 2026 / Separate opinion
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DIGITAL P. 4 / 37
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 4 G.R. Nos. 271347, 278353,
E-02472 & E-04036
There is a historical irony in this arrangement. The constitutional
limitations on the budget process existing today have antecedents in the fiscal
system established during the period of American colonial administration of
the philippines.
Take for example Article VI, Section 25(7) of the Constitution,7 which
provides that if Congress fails to pass an appropriations law for the ensuing
fiscal year, the appropriations law of the past year is deemed reenacted. The
origin of this provision can be found in the third paragraph of Section 7 of the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902.8 The provision ensured them that the
Philippine Assembly, which was the legislative chamber controlled by
Filipinos, would not be able to stop the operations of the American colonial
government upon its failure, deliberate or otheiwise, to enact an
appropriations law.
Then, under Section 21 of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,9 the
American Goven1or General was subsequently required to submit to the
Philippine Legislature a "budget of receipts and expenditures, which shall be
the basis of the annual appropriation bill." It likewise vested the Governor
• General with the power to veto particular items in an appropriation bill.10
These early laws thus established the institutional limitations that
would be central to Philippine national budgeting: the Chief Executive
prepares and proposes the national budget, while the Legislature considers the
same and enacts it as an appropriations law, while the Chief Executive retains
the power to disapprove any line item found therein.
The rationale for these limitations may have been rooted in the desire
for the American Governor General to retain some form of control over the
appropriations power of the Filipino-controlled Legislature. Strikingly, this
7 CONST., art. VI, sec. 25(7) states:
If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations
bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect nntil the general appropriations bill is passed by
the Congress.
32, Stat. 691, 694 (1902) states:
• ... That if at the termination of any session the appropriations necessary for the support of
government shall not have been made, an amount equal to the sums appropriated in _the last appropriation
bills for snch purposes shall be deemed to be appropriated; and until the legislature shall act in such
behalf the treasurer may, with the advice of the goven10r, make the payments necessary for the purposes
aforesaid.
9 39 Stat. 545,552 (1916) states:
. : . He shall submit within [] OJ days of the opening of each regular session of. the Philippine
Legislature a budget ofreceipts and expenditures, which shall be the basis of the annual appropriation
bill.
10 39 Stat. 545,551 (1916) states:
. _ . The Governor General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill, but the veto' shall not affe~ the item or items to :"'hich h~ doe: not_obje~- The item_ or
items objected to shall not take effect except m the mruu1er heretotore provided m tl11s sectI.on as to bills
and joint resolutions retnmed to the legislature without his approval.
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